

# Midterm Exam Answers: Economics 101

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## 1. Short Answers


a)

	L	R
U	10*,5*(not efficient)	11,0
D	5,3	12*,5*(efficient)

b)

	L	R
U	3,1	2*,9*(efficient)
D	7*,-1*(efficient)	1,-3

c)




subgame perfect equilibrium (D,d) is efficient

normal form

	U	D
u	1*,0	0,5*
d	1*,0	5*,4* (efficient)

Note that there is only one Nash equilibrium and it is also subgame perfect

d)



subgame perfect equilibrium of U,u is inefficient

normal form

	u	d
U	2*, -2*	2, -2*
D	1, 1*	3*, 0

The Nash equilibrium is the same as the subgame perfect equilibrium.

## 2. Hotelling Duopoly

a) For given prices  $p_1, p_2$  of the two stores, which location is exactly indifferent between the stores?  $-p_1 - x = -p_2 - (1 - x)$  so  $x = (p_2 - p_1 + 1) / 2$

b) What is the demand for Marty's groceries?  $x = (p_2 - p_1 + 1) / 2$  For Ginnie's?  
 $1 - x = 1 - (p_2 - p_1 + 1) / 2 = (p_1 - p_2 + 1) / 2$

c) What are the Nash equilibrium prices of the price-setting game?

Marty's profit  $(p_1 - 2)(p_2 - p_1 + 1) / 2$  maximized when  $(p_2 - p_1 + 1) / 2 - (p_1 - 2) / 2 = 0$

or  $p_2 - 2p_1 + 3 = 0$


Ginnie's profits  $(p_2 - 1)(p_1 - p_2 + 1) / 2$  maximized when  $(p_1 - p_2 + 1) / 2 - (p_2 - 1) / 2 = 0$

or  $p_1 - 2p_2 + 2 = 0$ , or  $p_1 = 2p_2 - 2$

Plug in to Marty's FOC and find  $p_2 - 2(2p_2 - 2) + 3 = 0, p_2 = 7/3$ . Plug into Ginnie and find  $p_1 = 8/3$ .

## 3. How to get a job?

a) Find the extensive form of this game.



- b) Find normal form of this game. Find all Nash equilibria of this game.  
 c) Which of the Nash equilibria are Pareto Efficient and which are not?

	J	N
W,S	-10,0*	-10,0*
W,M	20*,10*(efficient)	-20,0
L,S	10,0*	10*,0*
L,M	5,-10	0,0*

- d) Apply the theory of iterated weak dominance to this game.

No dominance for player 2

For player 1, L,M and W,S are strictly dominated by L,S

The reduced game is below

	J	N
W,M	20*,10*(efficient)	-20,0
L,S	10,0*	10*,0*

Now J *weakly* dominates N giving

	J
W,M	20*,10*(efficient)
L,S	10,0*

Finally, W,M strictly dominates L,S, leaving just the efficient Nash equilibrium.